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American Law Schools 
in a Time of Transition
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Being dean of an American law school these days is no easy task. To name 
a few of the challenges:
The economic model for law schools is breaking down because of the 
collapse of the job market for new lawyers, making it difficult to justify ever 
increasing tuition levels.
The American Bar Association is contemplating changing standards for law 
school accreditation. Concern has been expressed that the implicit requirement 
that most law school teaching be done by tenured and tenure-track faculty 
will be eliminated—a change that could have profound implications for the 
academic freedom of faculty members and their engagement in important 
public policy debates.
Finally, law schools are under pressure to diversify their student bodies and 
faculties with racial/ethnic and socioeconomic dimensions in mind.
But the challenges American law schools face are not unique. Because they 
are part of a much broader higher education system, there are lessons from 
that broader academic experience that may prove useful to them.
What’s Been Happening in American Higher Education?
During the last three decades, undergraduate tuition levels increased each 
year, on average, by 3.5 percent more than the rate of inflation at private four-
year academic institutions. The comparable increases for public four-year and 
public two-year institutions were 5.1 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.1 
Tuition increases in private higher education have been associated over 
this period with increased real expenditures per student. In public higher 
1. Sandy Baum & Jennifer Ma, College Board, Trends in College Pricing fig. 4 (2011), available 
at http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_Pricing_2011.pdf.
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education, as I detail below, tuition increases often only have helped to 
compensate for reductions in state support.2 
I have discussed extensively elsewhere the forces that cause private and 
public undergraduate tuition levels to continually increase at rates that exceed 
the rate of inflation, as measured by the rate of increase in the Consumer Price 
Index.3 For private institutions, they include: 
• The aspirations of academic institutions, similar to other nonprofit 
institutions, to be the very best they can be in every measure of their 
activities, calling for ever increasing resources. 
• The perception by students and parents that where they go to college is 
almost as important as whether they go, and the belief that higher priced 
selective private institutions confer unique educational and economic 
advantages on their students. This leads to large applicant pools and 
only limited market pressures to slow tuition increases and it provides a 
cover for less selective institutions to raise tuition.4
• Published rankings, such as those of U.S. News & World Report, which 
are based partly on institutional expenditures per student, and thus lead 
to an arms race of spending. 
• The growth of technology which often comes at a high cost and leads 
to improvements in the quality of higher education. But these quality 
changes are not reflected in the rate of increase in tuition because—unlike 
2. Donna M. Desrochers, Colleen M. Lenihan & Jane V. Wellman, Delta Coast Project, 
Trends in College Spending 1998-2008 5 (2010), available at http://www.deltacostproject.org/
resources/pdf/Trends-in-College-Spending-98-08.pdf.
3. See, for example, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising]; Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 
The Perfect Storm and the Privatization of Public Higher Education (Cornell Univ. Press 
2005); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, What’s Happening to Public Higher Education? The Shifting 
Financial Burden (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2007); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Economics 
of Tuition and Fees in American Higher Education (Cornell Univ. Press 2007); B. Archibald 
& David H. Feldman, Why Does College Cost So Much? (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
4. Most studies, find that high priced selective private institutions confer educational and 
economic advantages on their students. Dominic J. Brewer, Eric R. Eide & Ronald G. 
Ehrenberg, Does it Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence of the 
Effects of College Type on Earnings, 34 J. Hum. Resources 104 (1998) [hereinafter Brewer et 
al., Cross-Cohort Evidence], available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/~mustard/courses/e8420/
Ehrenberg-JHR.pdf; and Eric R. Eide, Dominic J. Brewer & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Does it 
Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Evidence of the Effects of Undergraduate College 
Quality on Graduate School Attendance, 17 Econ. Educ. Rev. 371, 371-76 (1998), available at 
http://nersp.osg.ufl.edu/~lombardi/edudocs/eide.pdf. The only studies that find contrary 
evidence are Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More 
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J. 
Econ. 1491 (2002) [hereinafter Dale & Krueger, Estimating the Payoff], available at http://web.
missouri.edu/~podgurskym/Econ_4345/syl_articles/berg_krueger_selective_college.
pdf; and Stacy Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Returns to College Selectivity over 
the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 17159 (2011), available at http://inpathways.net/return_on_selectivity.
pdf.
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with the Consumer Price Index—adjustments are not made for quality 
when rates of tuition increases are figured. 
All of these factors apply to public higher education institutions as well, 
plus the pressure that cutbacks in state support put on tuition.
The nature of faculty positions has also changed dramatically during the 
last 30 to 40 years. The percentage of faculty nationwide that is full-time has 
declined from almost 80 percent in 1970 to 51.3 percent in 2007 and the vast 
majority of part-time faculty members do not have Ph.D.s.5 The percentage 
of full-time faculty not on tenure track has doubled between 1975 and 2007, 
increasing from 18.6 percent to 37.2 percent.6 As a result, today only about one-
third of the faculty teaching at American colleges and universities are full-time 
and tenured or on tenure-track appointments.
Why did this change in faculty composition happen during a period when 
undergraduate tuition levels increased in real terms, on average? Part of the 
reason is that the tuition discount rate—the share of each tuition dollar that 
institutions return to undergraduates in the form of need-based or merit grant 
aid—increased substantially at private four-year institutions. For example, the 
average tuition discount rate for full-time first-year students at private four-
year institutions reached 42 percent in the fall of 2008. The comparable figure 
in the fall of 1990 was 26.7 percent.7 Much of the increase in tuition revenues 
at private colleges and universities has been plowed back into undergraduate 
aid. At all but a handful of the wealthiest private schools, the vast majority of 
undergraduate financial aid dollars come largely from tuition revenue.
The wealthiest and most selective private colleges, which have no problems 
achieving their desired enrollment levels, dramatically increased the generosity 
of their financial aid policies during the period in response to evidence that 
relatively small fractions of their students were coming from lower- and lower 
middle-income families.8 These institutions also were influenced by rapid 
growth rates in their endowments during much of the period and by their 
relatively low endowment spending rates (which led to pressure from the 
U.S. Senate Finance Committee for them to increase endowment spending 
on financial aid). Dramatic increases in the financial need of their applicants 
because of the decline in family incomes and assets after the financial collapse 
5. Thomas D. Snyder & Sally A. Dillow, United States Department of Education, Digest of 
Education Statistics 2009 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010013_0.pdf.
6. Amer. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Trends in Faculty Status, 1975-2007, available at http://www.
aaup.org/our-work/research.
7. National Assn. of College and Univ. Business Officers, Newly Released NACUBO Tuition 
Discounting Study Survey Report Shows Rates Remain Stable (2009), available at http://
www.nacubo.org/Research/Research_News/Newly_Released_NACUBO_Tuition_
Discounting_Survey_Report_Shows_Rates_Remain_Stable.html; National Assn. of 
College and Univ. Business Officers, 2009 NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study of 
Independent Institutions (2010).
8. Beckie Supiano & Andrea Fuller, Elite Colleges Fail to Gain More Students on Pell Grants, 
Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 27, 2011, at 57. 
101American Law Schools in a Time of Transition
in 2008 also was a factor. Other private institutions, which use need-based 
and merit aid to craft their classes and to achieve desired enrollment levels, 
found that market forces do matter. Competition from lower-priced public 
institutions along with stagnating real family income levels during much of 
the period followed by declines in family incomes and assets after the financial 
collapse dramatically increased the need to raise grant aid and offer tuition 
discounts both to fill classes and to achieve the desired mix of students.9 
In public higher education, tuition increases have barely offset a long 
decline in student state appropriations. In fiscal year 2010, state appropriations 
per full-time equivalent student at public higher educational institutions 
averaged $6,454, a 19 percent decline from the peak year of fiscal 1987 when 
the comparable number was $7,993.10 Even before the impact of the Great 
Recession, real state appropriations per full-time equivalent student were still 
lower in fiscal year 2008 than they were 20 years earlier. Overall, the sum of 
net tuition revenue and state appropriations per full-time equivalent student 
at public institutions was roughly the same in real terms in fiscal 2010 as it was 
in fiscal 1987.11 
 In addition, academic institutions have changed how they allocate their 
resources. The share of institutional expenditures going to faculty salaries and 
benefits in both public and private institutions has fallen relative to that going 
to non-faculty uses such as student services, academic support and institutional 
support.12 Some observers have attributed this to administrative bloat and the 
declining influence of the faculty on decision making at universities.13 However, 
after experiencing the collapse of financial markets in 2008 and the Great 
Recession, many universities have hired external consultants to advise them 
on how to reduce administrative costs and are taking serious steps to do so. 
My own university, for example, is well on the way to reducing administrative 
costs on its Ithaca campus by between $75 million and $85 million a year. 
This represents 5 percent to 6 percent of its base annual operating budget, 
excluding external research funding. I must caution, however, that one-time 
reductions in administrative costs will not slow the rate of tuition increases. 
Continuous reductions in costs will be required to do that.
All of these things are occurring at a time when American higher education 
is facing enormous pressures. Our nation’s economic growth and prosperity 
9. While tuition levels rose in percentage terms by more at the four-year public institutions 
than they did at the four-year private schools during the period, because tuition levels were 
so much lower at the public schools at the start of the period, dollar increases in tuition were 
much larger at the private schools and the difference between public and private tuition 
levels (in real terms) increased during the period.
10. State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance: FY 2010 
(2011), fig. 3, available at http://www.sheeo.org/finance/shef_fy10.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Desrochers et al., supra note 2, at 18-19. 
13. Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fall of the Faculty; The Rise of the All-Administrative University 
and Why It Matters (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
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during the 20th century was driven by the fact that we led the world in terms 
of the share of our population that had college degrees.14 But other nations 
have overtaken us and today we rank no higher than 12 among 36 developed 
nations in the share of our young adult population with college degrees.15 
The groups in our population that are growing most rapidly—people of color, 
immigrants and people from relatively low income families—have historically 
been underrepresented in higher education. Improving access and college 
graduation rates is essential for our nation’s prosperity in an increasingly 
competitive and a knowledge-based economy. Concerns that high rates of 
tuition growth will prevent us from achieving our goals, coupled with the 
decline in income and assets caused by the Great Recession, are putting 
pressure on private and public higher education institutions to limit tuition 
increases.
Public colleges and universities, where the vast majority of American 
undergraduate students are educated, face pressures to increase enrollments 
and graduation rates at the same time that state support is being cut. A 
growing private for-profit higher education sector which now enrolls almost 
10 percent of all students has attracted primarily adult learners interested in 
education leading to careers. The largest players, including the University of 
Phoenix, have been among the leaders in restructuring education through the 
use of technology to improve learning and reduce costs. Notable efforts from 
the nonprofit sector to similarly do so include the work of the National Center 
for Academic Transformation16 and the Open Learning Initiative at Carnegie 
Mellon University.17
The for-profits also have been among the leaders in reducing reliance on 
tenure and tenure-track faculty, seeking to measure learning outcomes and 
evaluating instructors based on what their students learn. Recent research 
concluded that very little learning actually occurs for many American students 
in higher education and this has added to the pressures for accountability that 
academic institutions now face.18 Colleges and universities are increasingly 
being asked to provide information on how they assess learning outcomes as 
part of the accreditation process.
Possible Reduced Reliance on Tenure and Tenure-Track Faculty
Proposed accreditation guidelines from the Standards Revision Committee 
of the American Bar Association would remove language that many faculty 
14. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology 
(Belknap Press 2008).
15. Tamar Lewin, Once a Leader, U.S. Lags in College Degrees, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2010, at 
A11.
16. See http://www.thenatcat.org.
17. See http://oli.web.cmu.edu/openlearning/initiative.
18. Richard Arum & Josipa Roska, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on American 
Campuses (Univ. of Chicago Press 2011).
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members—but not the ABA committee—have interpreted as requiring law 
schools to maintain a tenure system and to have most law school teaching 
conducted by full-time law school faculty.19
A traditional argument for the importance of a tenure system for faculty is 
based on academic freedom. Absent tenure and the job security it provides 
faculty members may be reluctant to pursue research on—or to engage in—
public debate over controversial issues. Michael Olivas eloquently expressed 
this view in his presidential address to the American Association of Law 
Schools in 2011. And if one wanted to single out a single academic discipline 
in which such academic freedom is absolutely essential, it certainly would be 
law, where many faculty members debate and write about controversial public 
policy issues frequently.20
The importance of this rationale for tenure was brought home to me 
personally in the late 1970s when several trustees at my own institution 
challenged my promotion to professor because they disagreed with testimony 
I had given in a New York State regulatory proceeding.21 President Frank 
Rhodes, who had arrived at Cornell only a few months earlier and who had 
never met me, suggested to the trustees that academic decisions were best 
left to academics and my promotion went through. The Cornell Trustees as 
a body shortly thereafter formally took the position, which it has repeatedly 
reaffirmed over the years, that academic decisions are best left to academics 
and that the final decisions on individual tenure and promotion cases are to 
be made by the provost and the president of Cornell, with the trustees giving 
only pro forma approval. 
Economists have developed a number of other arguments that can be used 
to support the importance of tenure systems. Because a tenure system provides 
senior faculty with some job security, they have an incentive to fully share 
their expertise with junior colleagues and students without fear of creating 
competitors who will challenge their positions. In this way, tenure facilitates 
the intergenerational transmission and expansion of knowledge.22
 The tenure system can also be thought of as an implicit long-term contract 
model or a winner-take-all tournament model; both of these models provide 
incentives for all faculty members to work harder than otherwise would 
be the case.23 Labor economists would argue that tenure is a desirable job 
19. Scott Jaschik, Law School Tenure in Danger, Inside Higher Ed, July 26, 2010, available at 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/07/26/law.
20. Michael Olivas, Academic Freedom and Academic Duty, AALS News, March 2011, available 
at http://www.als.org/services-newsletter-presMarch11.php.
21. The incident is described in Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising, supra note 3, at 127. 
22. George J. Stigler, The Intellectual and the Marketplace 1-9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).
23. Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1261 (1979), available 
at http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/fuernkranz/lazear_mandatory_retirement.pdf; 
Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts, 
89 J. Pol. Econ. 841 (1981), available at http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/persone/Natale/
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characteristic and, in its absence, academic institutions would have to pay 
higher salaries to attract faculty of a given quality. Indeed, research that I and 
two collaborators have done suggests that, after controlling for other factors 
that influence salaries, economics departments that offer lower probabilities of 
tenure have to pay higher starting salaries to attract new faculty.24
While these arguments supporting a tenure system are important, one 
may reasonably ask this question: Why should the typical college student be 
taught by a researcher on the frontier of his field when the material the student 
is being taught may be miles inside the frontier? Doesn’t heavy reliance on 
tenured and tenure-track faculty needlessly raise the cost of undergraduate 
education? Put simply, what is lost if undergraduate students are taught by 
adjuncts or full-time but not tenure-track faculty while a smaller number of 
tenure-track faculty focuses on research and graduate education? 
Only recently have economists and other social scientists begun to address 
this issue and their findings suggest there is no such thing as a “free lunch” in 
higher education. For example, Liang Zhang and I studied institutional-level 
data for a number of years. After controlling for other factors, we found that, 
when a four-year academic institution increases its use of either full-time faculty 
not on tenure track or part-time instructors, its undergraduate students’ first-
year persistence rates and graduation rates decreased.25 Several other studies 
have found that greater reliance on part-time faculty reduces both graduation 
rates for two-year students and the likelihood they will transfer to four-year 
colleges.26 Still other studies have found that both public two- and four-year 
college students who take “adjunct heavy” first year class schedules are less 
likely to persist in college after the first year.27 
Not all studies suggest that adjuncts always adversely influence academic 
outcomes. For example, Bettinger and Long,28 in a study that may be 
economia_del_personale/Letture%5CLR81.pdf.
24. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Paul J. Pieper & Rachel A. Willis, Do Economics Departments with 
Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay Higher Faculty Salaries?, 80 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 503, 503-12 
(1998). 
25. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Liang Zhang, Do Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Matter?, 40 J. 
Hum. Resources 647 (2005).
26. Daniel Jacoby, Effects of Part-Time Faculty Employment on Community College Graduation 
Rates, 77 J. Higher Educ. 1081, 1081-1103 (2006); M. Kevin Eagan, Jr. & Audrey J. Jaeger, 
Effects of Exposure to Part-Time Faculty on Community College Transfer, 50 Res. Higher 
Educ. 168 (2009); Audrey J. Jaeger & M. Kevin Eagan, Jr., Unintended Consequences: 
Examining the Effect of Part-Time Faculty Members on Associate’s Degree Completion, 36 
Community C. Rev. 167 (2009).
27. Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, The Increased Use of Adjunct Instructors at Public 
Universities: Are We Hurting Students, in What’s Happening to Higher Education? 51-70 
(Ehrenberg ed., Greenwood Press 2007); Audrey J. Jaeger & M. Kevin Eagan, Jr., Examining 
Retention and Contingent Faculty Use in a State System of Public Higher Education, 25 
Educ. Pol’y 507 (2011). 
28. Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, Does Cheaper Mean Better: The Impact of Using 
Adjunct Instructors on Student Outcomes, 92 Rev. of Econ. and Stat. 598 (2010).
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particularly relevant to legal education, showed that having an adjunct as an 
instructor in an introductory class in some professional fields increases the 
likelihood that a student will take additional classes in the field. 
Given that many full-time, non-tenure faculty members are dedicated 
teachers and can devote themselves fully to undergraduate education because 
they do not have any research responsibilities, why might they adversely affect 
student outcomes as many of these studies suggest? Typically their teaching 
loads are higher than tenure-track faculty members, which may leave them 
with less time to work with individual students outside of class or to keep 
up with new developments in their fields. Adjunct faculty appointments are 
often ad hoc in nature and instructors trying to eke out a living from this type 
of work often must take on much heavier teaching loads, sometimes spread 
across multiple institutions in urban areas. This leaves them little time and 
often no place to meet students but in the classroom.29 They also are less likely 
to be up to date on their department’s curriculum and therefore may be less 
prepared to advise students.
However, what appears to be true for undergraduate education is not 
necessarily true for legal education. Adjuncts in law schools are typically 
practicing lawyers who bring professional knowledge to the classroom. 
Non-tenure track, full-time faculty in law schools are often found in clinical 
areas. Would adoption of an accreditation standard that deemphasized the 
importance of tenured and tenure-track faculty actually have any adverse 
effect on law students’ education?
To answer such a question requires one to specify what the outcomes of 
legal education are and then to estimate whether the composition of faculty 
at a law school influences these outcomes. During the past year a group of 
undergraduate and graduate students and I took a first stab at doing this. 
We obtained the data to conduct our research from the Official Guide to ABA 
Approved Law Schools. The most recent year’s data was available on the Law 
School Admission Council website, five previous years’ data were obtained 
electronically from the ABA, and data for an additional eight years came from 
published volumes of the Guide.30
The law school performance measures available in the Guide were the 
attrition rate of first-year students for academic reasons and the bar passage 
rate for first-time test takers from the law school for the jurisdiction in which 
the largest numbers of its students took the bar exam. We adjusted the latter 
rate by comparing it to that state’s average bar pass rate for first-time test 
takers.31
29. Liang Zhang & Xiangmin Liu, Faculty Employment at 4-Year Colleges and Universities, 29 
Econ. Educ. Rev. 543 (2010) (showing that four-year academic institutions in urban areas 
make more use of part-time faculty than other four-year institutions).
30. I am grateful to Kenneth Williams at the ABA for providing us with the electronic data. 
31. In computing this variable we first recalculated the state average pass rate removing the 
school’s test takers and test passers from the data.
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The Guide’s faculty categorization was not ideal for our study.32 These 
categories are: the shares of faculty who are “full-time,” “other full-time,” “deans 
and librarians and others who teach” and “part-time.” The full-time faculty 
measure included not only tenure and tenure-track faculty but also clinical and 
other faculty on multiyear appointments, as well as visitors temporarily filling 
“full-time” slots. The “other full-time” faculty measure included other people 
teaching full-time to whom no multi-year commitment had been made.
Nonetheless, we estimated whether either the academic attrition rate 
measure or our “adjusted” bar passage rate measures were associated with the 
shares of faculty at an institution from the different groups.33 Our equations 
attempted to control for other factors that might be related to the outcomes, 
including student GPA and LSAT scores and, in some specifications, the 
gender/racial/ethnic distribution of students. We found no evidence from our 
analyses that the distribution of faculty across the types that were available to 
us had any effect on the first-year academic attrition rates or the adjusted bar 
passage rates of graduates of the institutions.
I must emphasize that the data we were using were inadequate to address 
the question of whether full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty matter. 
We did not have information on the share of faculty that were tenured 
or on tenure-track. Equally problematic, we had no information on the 
characteristics of faculty who were teaching first-year classes—the classes that 
would be most relevant in determining attrition after the first-year. We also 
had no information on the characteristics of faculty teaching basic second-year 
survey classes, which along with the first-year classes, cover the majority of the 
material that appears on bar exams. In theory, one could obtain information 
on the characteristics of the relevant faculty from copies of the annual AALS 
Directory of Law Teachers, but to do so in a cost efficient way would require the 
AALS to allow researchers access to electronic versions of the Directory.
I also make no claim that the student performance measures we used are 
the best available. The AALS might profitably address what better measures 
might be used. One might consider, for example, job market outcomes. 
Studies using job market outcomes would be akin to large numbers of studies 
by economists that seek to ascertain if labor market earnings of college 
graduates are related to the characteristics of the undergraduate institutions 
they attended.34 As is commonly known, however, published data on the share 
of a law school’s graduates who are employed and their salary levels have come 
under attack and better earnings data will need to be collected before one can 
focus on this outcome. What seems clear, however, is that before seriously 
32. I am grateful to Richard Robinson, Associate Dean for Administration and Finance at the 
Cornell Law School for helping me to understand the classifications of faculty in the Guide 
and the years to which various data elements refer.
33. We used the faculty shares for the year the students were first-year students in the attrition 
equation and experimented with these shares and the average shares over the three years 
they were enrolled in law school in the bar passage equations.
34. Brewer et al., Cross-Cohort Evidence, supra note 4 at 104-23; Dale & Krueger, supra note 4.
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proposing accreditation standards that decrease reliance on tenure and tenure-
track faculty the ABA should want to know the answer to the question: “Do 
tenured and tenure-track faculty matter in law schools?” 
Diversifying Law School Faculty
American higher education institutions are trying to diversify their faculties 
across race, gender and ethnic lines. If talent is equally distributed across all 
groups, to do otherwise would not provide maximum faculty quality. While role 
models for students do not have to be of the same race, gender and ethnicity, 
some (but not all) research relating to undergraduate students suggests that 
female students are more likely to persist in science and engineering fields 
if the instructor in their introductory class is female. Analogous results were 
found in one study for African American students and African American 
professors.35A recent New York Law Review survey suggests that law schools with 
a high percentage of full-time female faculty members had a larger percentage 
of female students on their flagship law reviews.36
In a recent study, colleagues and I also addressed the role that the leaders 
of American colleges and universities—trustees, presidents and provosts—play 
in influencing the rate at which academic institutions diversify their faculties 
across gender lines.37 While a much more direct role in faculty hiring is played 
by faculty search committees, department chairs and deans, presidents and 
provosts establish the “rules of the game” for faculty searches and make their 
expectations clear in terms of efforts to diversify. Trustees in turn make clear 
what their goals are for the institution during the process of hiring a president 
and monitor the institution’s and the president’s progress in meeting these 
goals. It is now quite common for trustees to require an annual report on 
faculty diversity efforts.
Using institutional level data spanning the 1984-2007 period in our study 
for a set of four-year colleges and universities, we estimated whether the 
35. Examples include Kevin N. Rask & Elizabeth M. Bailey, Are Faculty Role Models? 
Evidence from Major Choice in an Undergraduate Institution, 33 J. Econ. Educ. 99 (2002); 
Scott E. Carrell, Marianne E. Page & James E. West, Sex and Science: How Professor 
Gender Perpetuates the Gender Gap, 125 Q. J. Econ. 101 (2010); Joshua Price, The Effect of 
Instructor Race and Gender on Student Persistence in STEM Fields, 29 Econ. Educ. Rev. 
901, 901-910 (2010). Studies concluding that the gender match of faculty and students does 
not enhance female students’ persistence include Brandice J. Canes & Harvey S. Rosen, 
Following in Her Footsteps: Faculty Gender Composition and Women’s Choice of Majors, 
48 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 484 (1995); Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, Do Faculty 
Serve as Role Models? The Impact of Instructor Gender on Female Students, 95 American 
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 152, 152-157 (2005); Amanda L. Griffith, 
Persistence of Women and Minorities in STEM Field Majors: Is it the School that Matters?, 
29 Econ. Educ. Rev. 911, 911-921 (2010). 
36. Karen Sloan, Faculty Diversity Means Gains for Female Law Students According to 
Study, Nat’l L. J., Nov. 2, 2011, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
jsp?id=1202523658844.
37. Ehrenberg et al., Diversifying the Faculty Across Gender Lines: Do Trustees and 
Administrators Matter?, 31 Economics of Education Review 9-18 (February 2012).
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gender of the president and the provost, as well as the share of trustees who 
were female influenced the rate at which the institution diversified its faculty 
across gender lines. We controlled for other variables that might be expected 
to influence this rate (for example, a measure of the expected share of new 
hires that should be female based upon the “female Ph.D. intensity” of the 
fields in which the institution employed faculty). We found that institutions 
with either female presidents or provosts, as well as those with a greater share 
of female trustees increased the female share of their faculties at a more rapid 
rate over the period. We also found that the magnitude of the effects of these 
leaders is larger at smaller institutions, where central administrators typically 
play a greater role in faculty hiring decisions, and that a critical mass of female 
trustees—at least 25 percent—had to be reached, before the gender composition 
of the board mattered.
Earlier studies by social scientists had also found evidence that the gender 
composition of deans and department chairs appeared to influence the rate 
at which new female faculty were hired.38 My students and I knew from the 
AALS Statistical Reports on Law Faculty that in 1990-91 only 8.5 percent of law 
school deans were female and only 6.8 percent were people of color. By 2007-
08, these percentages had risen respectively to 19.8 and 12.7. These changes 
led us to wonder if we could adapt the methodology used in our paper to 
estimate whether the gender of the dean at a law school influences the rate at 
which the school diversifies its faculty across gender lines and, similarly, if the 
race/ethnicity of the dean influences the rate at which the school diversifies its 
faculty across racial/ethnic lines.
Through online searches of Directory of Law Teachers, my students identified 
the gender and minority status of the dean of each ABA accredited law school 
each year from 1997-98 to 2010-2011. They then estimated equations using 
institutional level data in which the change in the share of the full-time faculty 
(obtained from issues of the Official Guide) that was female between two years 
was specified to be a function of the gender of the dean and of the initial year’s 
share of female faculty. They conducted similar analyses for changes in the 
share of faculty that were minority using the minority status of the dean as 
the key explanatory variable. In none of the specifications that they estimated 
did they find any evidence that the gender of the dean significantly influenced 
the rate at which the gender distribution of the full-time faculty changed nor 
did they find any evidence that having a minority dean influenced the rate at 
which the share of the full-time faculty that was minority changed.
There are compelling reasons to try to diversify the leadership of law 
schools that go beyond changing the rate at which law schools diversify their 
38. See, for example, Rebecca L. Bach & Carolyn C. Perruci, Organizational Influences on the 
Sex Composition of College and University Faculty: A Research Note, 57 Soc. Educ. 193 
(1984); Stephen Kulis, Gender Segregation Among College and University Employees, 70 
Soc. Educ. 151 (1997); Alison M. Konrad & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Understanding the Hiring of 
Women and Minorities in Educational Institutions, 64 Soc. Educ. 141 (1991); Anna Mari 
May, Elizabeth A. Moorhouse & Jennifer A. Bossard, Representation of Women Faculty at 
Public Research Universities; Do Unions Matter?, 63 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 699 (2010).
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faculty so our evidence should not be interpreted as suggesting that efforts 
to diversify law school leadership should be reduced. Moreover, once again 
our research is not the definitive work on the topic. Changes in faculty shares 
results from hiring decisions, from decisions by faculty to move to other law 
schools, to accept nonacademic employment and to retire. Law schools also 
make decisions not to grant tenure to tenure-track faculty. 
In addition, the gender and race/ethnic mixes of candidates for a law 
school faculty vacancy will depend on the specialty that school seeks to fill. 
For example, in 2007-08, 87.9 percent of antitrust law professors were male, 
but only 38.4 percent of family law professors were male. If the gender 
distributions of lawyers seeking faculty positions in antitrust and family law 
are similar to current faculty distributions, the likelihood that a vacant position 
will be filled by a female is much higher if the position is in family law than if 
it is in antitrust law. 
These considerations suggest that if the AALS is interested in conducting 
a better designed study of the impact of the gender and minority status of law 
school deans on diversifying their faculties, it will need to provide researchers 
with access to individual-level data on new hires from the Directory of Law Teachers, 
along with data on the “availability” of job applicants by gender and minority 
status that might be obtained from both the Directory and the Faculty Registry. 
Future studies might also profitably take into account that the responsibilities 
of law school deans are varied and it is possible that the key individuals whose 
gender and race/ethnicity might matter are the associate or assistant deans 
in charge of academic affairs and faculty hiring, along with faculty search 
committee chairs.
Ever Increasing Law School Tuition
The ABA Commission on the Impact of the Economic Crisis on the 
Profession and Legal Needs is well aware that law school tuition, like 
undergraduate tuition, has risen substantially relative to the rate of inflation.39 
What is not as well known is that law school tuition has also increased 
substantially relative to undergraduate tuition in the last two decades. 
During the period between 1990 and 2009, average private law school 
tuition rose by 5.9 percent a year, while average private undergraduate tuition 
rose by half a percentage point less a year. Similarly while a weighted average 
of resident and nonresident public undergraduate tuition levels rose by about 
6.8 percent a year during the period, average public resident and nonresident 
law school tuition levels rose by 9.1 and 7.5 percent a year, respectively.40 
39. ABA Commission on the Impact of the Economic Crises on the Profession and Legal 
Needs, The Value Proposition of Attending Law School (2009), at 1, available at http://www.
americanbar.org.
40. The law school tuition data are from the ABA and the undergraduate tuition figures from 
the College Board. 
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Why has this occurred? One possibility is that law school faculty salaries 
have increased more than faculty salaries in other academic disciplines and 
that higher tuition levels were necessary to attract and retain top law school 
faculty. I am not privy to data on salaries of faculty at private law schools but 
average salaries of faculty by discipline, including law, from a set of public 
universities and land grant colleges that are collected annually by the Office 
of Institutional Research and Management at Oklahoma State University are 
published periodically in Academe. English professors are a good comparison 
group because the Oklahoma State data indicate that salaries in many other 
fields have risen relative to those in English.
In 1991-92, the average salary of professors of law and legal studies was 
about 154 percent of the average salary of professors in English. By 2009-2010, 
the advantage of law professors had increased only slightly, to 159.5 percent. 
The comparable salary ratio advantages at the assistant professor level were 
179.2 percent in 1991-92 and 171.6 percent in 2009-2010. Thus, during the 
period, salaries of assistant professors of law and legal studies actually fell a bit 
relative to those of assistant professors of English.41 While these data are only 
for public institutions, they do not provide strong support for the proposition 
that more rapid increases in law school tuitions were attributable to the need 
to raise revenue for law school faculty salaries.
As I mentioned earlier, a large fraction of undergraduate tuition at private 
colleges and universities goes back to undergraduate students in the form of 
need-based or merit-based financial aid. Indeed the wealthiest private schools 
have eliminated all loans from the financial aid packages of undergraduate 
students. In contrast, the debt loads that law school graduates have been 
assuming are extraordinary. A cursory look at the data included in the most 
recent U.S. News & World Report academic rankings show that almost half of ABA-
accredited law schools reported that 2010 graduates who incurred law school 
debt averaged more than $100,000 in loans. The percentages of graduates with 
law school debt at these schools ranged from 61 to 99. 
These numbers suggest that the typical private law school is probably not 
giving back as great a share of its tuition dollars in the form of grant aid as 
the typical private undergraduate institution. But I may be wrong. The Official 
Guide provides information on the share of recent students receiving grants 
or aid and the median amount of this aid for each law school. I checked the 
numbers for private law schools in New York State and found that between 
36 percent and 75 percent of their students received aid, with the median grant 
level for full-time students ranging from $7,500 to $20,000. If private law 
schools have used higher tuition to provide increased aid to students, it would 
be prudent for them to share this information with potential applicants.
Cutbacks in state support for higher education at public universities have 
often been larger at professional schools, such as law, than for undergraduate 
education. From the perspective of state policy makers, larger cuts for 
41. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Academe, March/April 2011, at 14-15, available at http://
www.aaup.org.
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professional schools make sense because more highly educated individuals are 
more mobile and less likely to remain in the state and pay taxes after graduation 
than are college graduates.42 Disproportionate cuts in state support for public 
law schools may partly explain their higher rates of tuition increases compared 
to public undergraduate students.
More likely, tuition increases at both public and private law schools have 
been driven by the same two forces that drive tuition increases in undergraduate 
education—the quest to accumulate resources so institutions can be the best 
they can be and the quest for prestige that is driven largely by published 
rankings of law schools, such as those of the U.S News & World Report. A ranking 
scheme that is partly based on the resources devoted to educating students 
puts pressure on law schools to spend more. A ranking scheme that is partly 
based on student selectivity puts pressure on lower ranked law schools to try to 
“buy” top students with merit aid.43 And a ranking system that is based partly 
on peer assessments and assessment scores by lawyers and judges puts pressure 
on law schools to be perceived as continually improving what they are doing 
and to spend money to convey such information to external constituents. 
Put simply, national law schools find themselves in a competitive arms race 
of spending; any institution that unilaterally cuts spending or increases it at 
a slower rate than its competitors will fall behind in the rankings. The past 
promise of large earnings for law school graduates—much higher earnings 
than those of typical college graduates—made potential law students willing 
to pay rapidly increasing tuition. However, the collapse of the labor market 
for new lawyers has greatly dampened the likelihood that future potential law 
students will be willing to assume such large loan burdens, at least temporarily. 
It is reasonable to project that law schools will have to moderate their rates of 
increase in tuition, or dramatically increase the share of tuition revenues that 
they give back in the form of grant aid.
 When a rankings scheme is based on a variety of self-reported variables, 
institutions have incentives to act to influence those variables so as to 
improve their rankings. I have written extensively about steps undergraduate 
institutions have taken to improve their U.S. News rankings—steps that may 
require increased spending but that have no positive effect on students’ 
experiences. Institutions also examine all the data they are going to submit to 
the magazine to see if there are legitimate things they can do that will make 
their data “look better.”44 However, when institutions take actions to improve 
42. However, state specific bar exams may dampen interstate mobility of lawyers. 
43. Jerome Organ recently addressed the extent to which some law schools award merit 
scholarships to entering first-year students that are much more difficult to renew in 
subsequent years than the students believe. He discusses how this impacts law students and 
the culture of law schools. Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and 
the Culture of Law Schools, 61 J. Legal Educ. 173 (2011). 
44. Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising, supra note 3, at 50-61. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Reaching for the 
Ring: How U.S. News & World Report Shapes the Competitive Environment in U.S. Higher 
Education, 26 Rev. Higher Educ. 145 (2003), available at http://theunbrokenwindow.com/
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their rankings that will mislead future applicants—such as allegations that 
some law schools give their graduates temporary jobs to inflate the reported 
employment probabilities—these institutions are coming close to violating 
ethical norms. And when they intentionally provide inaccurate data, as a 
number of law schools allegedly have done, they have definitely crossed the 
line.45 Law schools should be synonymous with ethical behavior. 
Because of obsessions with rankings and institutional prestige, many 
American higher education leaders appear to have stopped thinking about the 
important social role of higher education. Some leaders have kept their focus, 
however. Cornell’s President David Skorton, for example, barely blinked when 
I showed him data suggesting that, while Cornell’s undergraduate student body 
was getting better each year, it was improving at a slower rate than those of our 
competitors. Thus we were falling behind in student selectivity rankings and 
probably needed to figure out how to alter our financial aid policies to attract 
more top students. But when Skorton saw data in 2008 showing a decrease in 
the share of our students who received Pell Grants—the federal undergraduate 
grant program for students from lower- and lower middle-income families—
he dramatically increased the generosity of our grant aid programs for lower 
income students. This while Cornell was suffering serious structural budget 
deficit problems.
The controversies relating to the misreporting of law school data to U.S. News 
should help to remind AALS members that obsession with the magazine’s law 
school rankings is not in the social interest.
Higher%20Ed/Readings/Brass%20Ring.pdf; Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Method or Madness? 
Inside the USNWR Rankings, 189 J. College Admissions 29 (2005).
45. Doug Lederman, Disingenuous Data, Inside Higher Ed, Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/11/09/iona-admits-ex-official-misreported-data- 
outside-entities.
